Stock market efficiency in China: Evidence from the split-share reform
In: The quarterly review of economics and finance, Band 60, S. 125-137
ISSN: 1062-9769
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In: The quarterly review of economics and finance, Band 60, S. 125-137
ISSN: 1062-9769
SSRN
Working paper
During 2005-2006, the Chinese government implemented a reform aimed at eliminating the so-called non-tradable shares (NTS), shares typically held by the State or by politically connected institutional investors that were issued at the early stage of financial market development. Our analysis, based on the time series of risk factors and on the cross section of abnormal returns, confirms that the NTS reform affected stock prices, particularly benefiting small stocks, stocks characterized by historically poor returns, stocks issued by companies with less transparent accounts and poorer governance, and less liquid stocks Historically neglected stocks also witnessed an increase in the volume of trading and market prices.
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In: ECB Working Paper No. 1339
SSRN
In: ECB Working Paper No. 2216
SSRN
Working paper
In: IMF Economic Review, Band 63, Heft 3, S. 568-584
SSRN
In: Economic notes, Band 43, Heft 1, S. 21-38
ISSN: 1468-0300
Systemic risk is the risk of a collapse of the entire financial system, typically triggered by the default of one, or more, interconnected financial institutions. In this paper, we estimate the systemic risk contribution of Italian‐listed banks for the period 2000–2011. We follow a methodology first proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier and measure banks' contribution to systemic risk by ΔCoVaR, which measures the contribution of bank i to the financial system VaR when bank i is in a state of distress. We define 'the system' as the set of Italian‐listed banks in the sample. First, we find that the information contained in ΔCoVaR is different from that contained in the VaR. Therefore, regulators should take it into account in order to monitor the systemic risk posed by banks. Second, recent policy debate has focused on the danger posed by large banks and on the need to curb their size. We find that size is indeed the main predictor of a bank contribution to systemic risk. However, in the post‐Lehman period, leverage is also an important predictor of systemic risk. Consequently, any financial regulation designed only to curb banks' size could not completely eliminate systemic risk because it is exactly in crisis times that leverage becomes relevant. Hence, we conclude that ΔCoVaR is a very useful policy tool for regulators that can estimate which factors are more relevant in terms of contribution to systemic risk.